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Intelligence. 
 
The publication of Francis Galton’s Hereditary Genius (1869) pre-dates by several decades the 
period which is normally taken to be the moment marking the beginning of modern sociology.   
Writing in the aftermath of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species and The Ascent of Man, Galton 
maintained the real objective existence both of racial differences and of social class differences 
in mental ability.  Emile Durkheim’s insistence, in his Suicide (1896), that this phenomenon 
was to be explained primarily by collective rather than individual factors can be seen as a 
deliberate reaction against the prior tendency to suppose that human behaviour is biologically or 
genetically determined.  The question of the ‘heretability of intelligence’ was critical in 
resolving whether or not a sociology of education might be necessary or possible and whether it 
was justifiable to expend public finance in order to expand educational provision.  The 
acceptance in general that human behaviour is at least partly modified by social interaction, that 
human character is at least partly the product of ‘nurture’ rather than wholly determined by 
‘nature’ is a sine qua non for sociological research, and the debate about intelligence has 
provided a case study for this larger issue at significant moments in Western social history since 
1869. 
 
In 1953, Brian Simon wrote a small book entitled Intelligence Testing and the comprehensive 
school.  In the Preface to the text, a teacher asked:  ‘Have we achieved ‘secondary education for 
all’, the reform that was the keystone of the Education Act, 1944?  If not, why not?  What are 
the fundamental misconceptions and practices that stand in our way?’.  What was at stake was 
the widening of opportunity within the British educational system that was projected 
immediately at the end of the Second World War.  The teacher believed that Simon had exposed 
the obstacle to progress towards egalitarianism:  ‘He shows how the practice of intelligence 
testing is used to justify the curtailment of opportunity from the junior school onwards;  he 
shows also how theories based on intelligence testing uphold a form of school organisation, and 
forms of teaching, which make secondary education for all impossible.’  The book was 
reproduced in entirety in Simon’s Intelligence, Psychology and education.  A Marxist critique 
(1971) and he asked in a new introduction why a publisher should want to reprint the earlier 
text, since the reorganisation of secondary education on comprehensive lines was ‘now well 
under way’.  He indicated, however, that victory was far from secured in the U.S.  He suggested 
that ‘attempts to reanimate the ideology of “intelligence” testing in the United States, as a barrier 
to the declared policy of desegregating schools, indicate that there are powerful social and 
political forces in favour of reinstating the doctrine that intelligence is innate and impervious to 
educational influences, to the detriment of social and educational advance.’  He was especially 
referring to the article by Arthur Jensen which appeared in the Harvard Educational Review in 
1969 with the title:  ‘How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?’.  This article 
relied on data on identical and fraternal twins reared apart which had been accumulated by Cyril 
Burt from the 1920s and presented in his Factors of the Mind (1940).  Simon’s text of 1971 
criticised Burt’s work but, in the second edition of 1978, he was able to quote L.J. Kamin’s The 
Science and Politics of I.Q (1977) to suggest that Burt’s research had ‘fudged’ the evidence.  
 
Nevertheless, the debate continued and still continues.  The Burt Affair (Robert B. Joynson, 
1989) questioned Kamin’s criticisms and a new statement of the heretability thesis appeared in 
1994, occasioning much comment and political dispute. In The Bell Curve (1994), Charles 
Murray and Richard Herrnstein asserted, on the basis of statistics derived from the U.S. National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, that intelligence is largely inherited and that genes play a part in 
the fact that African-Americans score lower than whites on intelligence tests.  The debate about 
intelligence has always had important implications for developments in social and educational 
policy.  Michael Young’s satire of 1958 entitled The rise of the meritocracy, 1870-2033 was 
sub-titled:  an essay on education and inequality.  The book coined the word ‘meritocracy’ 
which then became part of the language of subsequent thinking about education and society, 
linking with the assumption of credentialism that occupational and social advancement are the 
consequence of individual merit.  Young proposed the formula that I.Q + Effort = Merit and 
expressed scepticism that social engineering might be achieved without reference to class 
assumptions or prejudices.  The implications of the debate now seem more serious as rapid 
developments occur as a result of research in genetics, cognitive neuroscience and molecular 
biology.  After some discussion of Spearman’s postulate that there must be a general factor of 
intelligence, labelled g, that is the underlying cause of an individual’s performance in varied 
tests, Francis Fukuyama commented in  his Our Posthuman future.  Consequences of the 
Biotechnology Revolution (2003) that scientific advances will soon generate a more refined 
understanding of this phenomenon, and that there is a possibility that the consequences of such 
good knowledge will be beneficial.  He suggests that brain imaging techniques can chart blood 
flow and neuron firings and that it may then become possible to correlate these with different 
kinds of mental activities so as to determine with some finality whether ‘g is one thing or many 
things’.  Bad science has been used for bad ends in the past but, as Fukuyama optimistically 
concludes his discussion of the sciences of the brain and the heritability of intelligence, this 
should not rule out the possibility that good science may serve us well in the future. 
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